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Rethinking Reexamination Reform:
Is It Time for Corrective Surgery, or Is
It Time to Amputate?
Kristen Jakobsen Osenga∗
INTRODUCTION
Patent law promotes technological change. Patents award a
limited monopoly to an inventor for his or her useful, nonobvious
invention—as well as for the time, energy, and money invested in
its creation. When that activity results in a useful invention, a
patent encourages further innovation as manufacturers and others
invest time, energy, and money into producing the invention on a
large scale and refining it for the consumer market. As they
proceed, manufacturers can remain secure in the knowledge that a
late-coming competitor cannot simply replicate their innovation
and enter the market quickly and cheaply. In addition to inducing
these productive behaviors, patents also disclose new technology
to the public. This disclosure advances scientific progress and puts
the world on notice by clearly defining boundaries around which
competitors must design. As a result, efficiency flourishes.
Due to the important roles that patents play in society, the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) is motivated only to issue
valid patents.
Invalid patents create problems including
unnecessary duplicative research efforts, instability in business
investing, and a decreasing number of technological advances
made available to the public. Since courts defer to the expertise of
∗
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the PTO, patents enjoy a presumption of validity in any lawsuit for
infringement. For all of these reasons, inventors, investors, the
public, and the judiciary must truly believe in the validity of
patents.
In this time of rapid technological change, sources of
knowledge have become increasingly decentralized. As a result,
the PTO might approve a patent application and issue a patent,
unaware of existing information that would render the patent
invalid. Responding to this concern in an effort to improve
confidence in the patent system, Congress enacted the first
reexamination laws over twenty years ago to provide a mechanism
to cure wrongfully issued patents. Since that time, it is doubtful
Congress’s hopes have been realized.
Reexamination was introduced as a mechanism for curing
potentially invalid patents, as an antidote to the public’s and the
judiciary’s lack of confidence in the PTO and the patent system in
general. Instead of a curative fix, however, the reexamination
provisions are more akin to a diseased or lame leg on the body of
U.S. patent law. Reexamination fails to support the burden of
public confidence it was intended to carry. It does not act in
harmony with other limbs on the body of patent law or with other
bodies of U.S. or foreign law. Over the years, Congress has
repeatedly introduced legislation to perform corrective surgery by
adding to or cosmetically altering the existing reexamination laws.
Instead of merely seeking to correct the existing problem, a more
sound course of treatment would be to amputate the current
reexamination proceedings in total. Congress could then provide a
prosthetic leg—an invalidation procedure that does not look
anything like the old limb but provides the same function. Such a
procedure may be awkward at first but will eventually become
natural. This Article explores the necessity of amputation and
proposes a workable, realistic prosthetic invalidation procedure.
Part I will describe the history of patent reform legislation
leading up to the passage of the original reexamination
proceedings and continuing through Congress’s most recent
attempt to correct some major reexamination deficiencies via the
American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (“AIPA”). Part II will
discuss and compare the original reexamination provisions, now
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known as “ex parte reexamination,” and the new provisions added
in 1999, known as “inter partes reexamination.” Further, recent
legislation to refine both reexamination provisions will be
described. Part III will evaluate the shortcomings of both the ex
parte and inter partes reexamination proceedings in light of
theories and objectives of patent law. Part IV will consist of a
comparative analysis of reexamination proceedings in the United
States with the revocation and opposition proceedings that exist in
Europe and Japan.
Finally, Part V proposes a realistic
recommendation that addresses these issues and considers
justifications for this proposed system.
I. CURING THE SPECTER OF INVALID PATENTS
A. Patents and Invalidity1
Patents are granted for applications describing eligible subject
matter that meet three threshold requirements of patentability and
contain an adequate disclosure of the invention. Eligible subject
matter includes “new and useful process[es], machine[s],
manufacture[s], or composition[s] of matter.”2 Court decisions
have clarified this to include “anything under the sun . . . made by
man”3 and exclude only “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas.”4 Once the subject matter is deemed eligible, the
invention is then examined to determine if the gateway
requirements of utility, novelty, and nonobviousness have been
met.5 The threshold of the utility requirement is quite low and
only requires that the invention confer some identifiable benefit.6
The novelty requirement comprises two prongs: (1) the invention
1

The following discussion about basic patent law is not comprehensive and serves
only to provide a background for the remainder of this Article.
2
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
3
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 n.6 (1980).
4
Id. at 309.
5
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03.
6
See Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 762 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he
fact that an invention has only limited utility and is only operable in certain applications
is not grounds for finding lack of utility.”); cf. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (allowing patents to be
issued for “any new and useful process” or “any new and useful improvement”).
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must not be anticipated, (2) nor may it be statutorily barred.7 To
avoid anticipation, the invention must not have been described in
another reference prior to invention by the applicant.8 Further, if
the invention was described, publicly used, or offered for sale more
than one year prior to the date the patent application was filed, the
applicant is statutorily barred from obtaining a patent.9 To be
deemed nonobvious, the invention must not be an obvious
combination of prior inventions.10 Finally, the application must
sufficiently disclose the invention by providing enough detail to
allow a person “ordinarily skilled in the art” to practice the
invention without undue experimentation, as well as provide the
best mode as it is known to the inventor.11 Once the examiner is
satisfied that the application meets the criteria, the patent is
granted.
A granted patent gives the inventor (or more likely, the
inventor’s assignee) the right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling the invention for twenty years from the date that
the patent application was filed.12 In essence, a patent creates a
limited, legal monopoly.
While monopolies are generally
disfavored as being against public policy, many economic and
philosophical justifications have been raised to support patent
protection.13
7

See 35 U.S.C. § 102.
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). In the case of anticipation, the inventor may be able to prove
invention prior to the date of the reference. See id. § 102(g). The purpose of this
provision is to ensure that the true inventor receives the patent.
9
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). The prior description in this provision must be in a printed
publication. See id. If statutorily barred, the inventor is not permitted to prove prior
invention. The purpose of this provision is to urge inventors to not sit on their rights. See,
e.g., LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1071
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
10
See 35 U.S.C. § 103; see, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 25–27 (1966)
(finding that the invention in question was not nonobvious because all of its elements
were also found in a previous invention, and the different arrangement of those elements
made no difference because “the mechanical operation [was] identical”).
11
See 35 U.S.C. § 112; see, e.g., White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control,
Inc., 713 F.2d 788, 790 (1983).
12
See 35 U.S.C. § 271; 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2003).
13
Economic rationales advanced in support of the patent monopoly include incentive to
create, incentive to innovate, incentive to disclose, and incentive to design around. For
more information about economic justifications, see generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
8
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Since before the mid-twentieth century, the patent system faced
hostility and skepticism from the federal judiciary, in part due to
the general antagonism toward monopolies.14 Judges, unlike
patent scholars who view the patent system through economic and
philosophic rationales, were not entirely swayed by the
justifications advanced in favor of the limited monopolies.15
Further compounding the problem, the judiciary also had “a
fundamental lack of trust in the competency of the PTO.”16 For
example, in Jungerson v. Otsby & Barton Co., Justice Jackson
noted in his dissent that “[i]t would not be difficult to cite many
instances of patents that have been granted, improperly . . . without
adequate tests of invention” by the PTO.17 This observation,
combined with judicial hostility, led Jackson to further conclude
that “the only patent that is valid is one which this Court has not
been able to get its hands on.”18 Even the statutory presumption of
validity,19 codified in the 1952 Patent Act, did little to shield patent
owners from judicial animosity.20 It was this specter of patent
invalidity in the eyes of the judiciary that led to the enactment of
the first reexamination laws.21
B. A Brief History of the Original Reexamination Provisions
Coming on the heels of the disapproval of patent monopolies
and the misgivings about PTO competence that colored the first
half of the twentieth century, the arrival of the duty of candor and

Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1017 (1989). Philosophical rationales include Locke’s labor dessert theory and
the Hegellian personhood theory. For more details, see generally Justin Hughes, The
Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988).
14
See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 667 (1944)
(characterizing patents as anti-competitive monopolies); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equip., 340 U.S. 147, 152–53 (1950).
15
See Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative
Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 9 (1997).
16
Id.
17
335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
18
Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
19
See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”).
20
See Janis, supra note 15, at 11.
21
Cf. id. at 12–15 (highlighting the reform proposals set forth in response to judicial
hostility, including proposals for reexamination).
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the inequitable conduct allegation in the early 1970s intensified the
negative spotlight on patent validity.22 With this in mind, a
committee from the American Bar Association (“ABA”) began
formulating a proposal for post-issuance reexamination in 1974.23
From 1974 to 1980, several different bills concerning
reexamination were introduced in the federal legislature.24 Many
of these bills were omnibus patent reform bills that sought to enact
massive overhauls of the U.S. patent system, with reexamination
being merely one portion therein.25 A number of the proposals
included a reexamination proceeding that looked very similar to
opposition proceedings that exist in other countries.26 Some
proposals even contained provisions that resembled miniature
trials.27
While these bills failed in Congress, the former PTO
commissioner, C. Marshall Dann, sought to create a procedure
within his powers, utilizing the reexamination concept.28 In
January 1977, Dann issued an order, popularly known as the
“Dann amendments.” The order granted a patentee the right to file
a reissue application to permit examination based on additional
prior art and broadened public participation by allowing protests
based on inequitable conduct and fraud.29 While the judiciary
22

See Donald Quigg, Post-Issuance Re-Examination: An Inventive Attempt at Reform,
NAT’L L.J., June 1, 1981, at 31. The allegation of “‘fraud on the patent office’ became an
almost automatic pleading,” raising the costs of litigation and casting an unflattering light
on the patent bar. Id.
23
See id. The American Bar Association (“ABA”) proposal called for reexamination
based on prior art, and included a filing fee that was high enough to cover the U.S. Patent
Trademark Office’s (“PTO”) expenses for this second examination. See id.
Foreshadowing things to come, the ABA proposal received endorsement from President
Jimmy Carter’s 1978 Committee on Industrial Innovation. See id.
24
See N. Thane Bauz, Reanimating U.S. Patent Reexamination: Recommendations for
Change Based upon a Comparative Study of German Law, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 945,
947 (1994).
25
See id.
26
See Janis, supra note 15, at 16.
27
See Quigg, supra note 22, at 31.
28
See id.
29
See id. It should be noted that two other avenues exist for third parties who become
aware of the substance of a pending application and who have information critical to
patentability—protest and public use proceedings. See Janis, supra note 15, at 16.
If a third party becomes aware of the substance of a pending application and knows of
prior art relevant to patentability, he or she may file a protest based on that prior art,
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readily accepted this practice, causing the validity of patents to be
strengthened in court, the Dann amendments turned the PTO into a
small-scale courthouse.30 The Dann amendments were finally
abolished in 1982 when it was determined that the new
reexamination procedure would make this process duplicative.31
Congress passed a bill in December 1980 incorporating the
ABA concept and framework for reexamination.32 On the floor of
the House, Representative Robert Kastenmeier (D-Wis.) described
the reexamination proposal as “an effort to reverse the current
decline in U.S. productivity by strengthening the patent . . .
system[] to improve investor confidence in new technology.”33
Later, the Federal Circuit reiterated in Patlex Corp. v.
Mossinghoff34 that the main goal of the reexamination statute when
enacted was to “cure defects in administrative agency action with
regard to particular patents and to remedy perceived shortcomings
in the system by which patents are issued.”35

identifying the application and listing relevant patents and publications, as well as the
relevance of each. See Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, 37 C.F.R. § 1.291 (2003). The
protest, however, must be filed prior to the publication of the application. See id. The
role of the third party “ends with the filing of the protest,” and the third party learns
nothing of the outcome until the patent issues. Id. Protests are rarely filed. See Janis,
supra note 15, at 16.
Public use proceedings are equally rare. See id. A third party who becomes aware of
a patent application may file a petition informing the PTO of public use or on-sale
activity occurring more than one year before the filing date of the application. See Rules
of Practice in Patent Cases, 37 C.F.R. § 1.292 (2003). If the commissioner determines
that the petition raises a reasonable question of statutory bar, he or she may designate an
“appropriate official” to take testimony. Id.; see also MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 720.04 (8th ed. 2001) [hereinafter MPEP]. Upon completion of the
testimony, the examiner issues a non-reviewable decision. See id. § 720.03.
30
See Quigg, supra note 22, at 31. Experienced examiners were pulled from already
poorly-manned examining groups to handle these protests, leading to general inefficiency
throughout the PTO. See id. Parties were often tied up in the PTO for an extended period
of time, sometimes spending upwards of $100,000 for a process that was supposed to be
quick and economical. See id.
31
See Janis, supra note 15, at 19.
32
See Quigg, supra note 22, at 31–32.
33
126 CONG. REC. 29,895 (1980) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
34
758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
35
Id. at 603.
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C. Legislative Reform of the Reexamination Provisions
Since the enactment of the reexamination proceedings in 1981,
concerns emerged as to the statute’s success in meeting the
curative goal enunciated above. In fact, as early as 1981
commentators and scholars raised doubts about the success of
reexamination.36 Further, an additional goal for reexamination
proceedings materialized in the interim—the reduction of patent
litigation.37 These concerns resulted in another flurry of proposed
legislation.
Reexamination reform legislation was introduced every year
from 1994 to 1997.38 Notably, in 1997 an omnibus patent reform
bill, House Bill 400, was introduced that addressed several key
concerns in patent law.39 House Bill 400 passed in April 1997
after surviving comprehensive hearings and amendments in the
Subcommittee on the Courts and Intellectual Property, which is a
subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary.40 While the
“Senate Committee on the Judiciary reported a substitute version
of the bill,” Senate Bill 507, the full Senate took no action.41
These bills varied greatly due to amendments adopted during floor
consideration of House Bill 400.42 The Senate bill amended the
current reexamination proceeding to eliminate some of the
disincentives of using reexamination instead of resorting to district
court litigation to determine validity.43 The House version
subsequently deleted this entire provision.44
Not to be discouraged, reexamination reform was introduced
yet again in 1999; the 106th Congress enacted the first successful
reform legislation concerning reexamination since the proceedings

36

See, e.g., Kenneth R. Adamo, Reexamination—To What Avail? An Overview, 63 J.
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 616, 617 (1981).
37
See Janis, supra note 15, at 40–41.
38
See id. at 4 n.3.
39
See H.R. REP. NO. 106-287, pt. 1, at 31 (1999).
40
See id.
41
Id.
42
See id.
43
See id. at 32.
44
See id.
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were inaugurated almost two decades ago.45 The House of
Representatives passed the AIPA in August 1999.46 Though the
passage of this bill was only the first step in the realization of
patent reform, the fact that the strongest proponents of patent
reform were able to gain the support of some of their most vocal
opponents implied that this bill had a more optimistic future than
the failed patent legislation noted above.47 AIPA’s stated purpose
is to “provide enhanced protection for inventors and innovators,
protect patent terms, [and] reduce patent litigation . . . .”48 With
unusual speed, the Senate picked up the patent reform ball and ran
with it. On November 17, 1999, Senate Bill 1948, which
contained the essential provisions of House Bill 1907, was
introduced in the Senate.49 On November 19, 1999, the provisions
of Senate Bill 1948 were incorporated by reference into House Bill
3194, an omnibus spending bill subsequently passed by both the
House and the Senate.50 On November 22, 1999, this bill was sent
to President William Clinton,51 who signed the measure into law
on November 29, 1999.52
45

See H.R. 1907, 106th Cong. (1999). The bill was finally enacted as part of House
Bill 3194, 106th Cong. (1999), incorporating by reference Senate Bill 1948, 106th Cong.
(1999).
46
See id.
47
Representative Dana Rohrbacher (R-Calif.) was initially one of the most outspoken
detractors of patent reform, fearing that it did not sufficiently protect the small inventor.
See Victoria Slind-Flor, Long-fought Patent Changes Arrive, NAT’L L. J., Dec. 20, 1999,
at B15. After compromises occurred at a meeting sponsored by the PTO, however,
Rohrbacher became a co-sponsor of the bill in the House. See id.
48
American Inventors Protection Act, H.R. 1907, 106th Cong. (1999) (emphasis
added). Title I, as initially introduced in the House, protected inventors from
unscrupulous inventor promotion services. See id. Title II provided a new defense
against patent infringement for earlier inventors who did not patent their discovery. See
id. Title III guaranteed a reasonable patent term by granting extensions for delays within
the PTO. See id. Title IV harmonized the U.S. patent application system with other
bodies of patent law by providing for pre-issue publication. See id. Title V altered the
reexamination procedures. See id.
49
See Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, S.
1948, 106th Cong. (1999) (enacted).
50
See Steven Moore & James Jakobsen, The Rules Change Again: The American
Inventors Protection Act of 1999, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, June 2000, at 49 n.4.; see also
H.R. 3195, 106th Cong. (1999).
51
Cf. 106 BILL TRACKING H.R. 3194 (1999) (“Became Public Law . . . 11/22/99.”).
52
See American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501
(1999).
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II. EX PARTE AND INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION
A. The Original Reexamination Provisions
Before December 1999, sections 301 through 307 of the Patent
Act governed all reexamination proceedings. Now called ex parte
reexamination procedures,53 these still-valid provisions allow
“[a]ny person at any time,”54 to request a reexamination by filing a
written request in the PTO.55 The written request must cite
appropriate prior art and state how this art pertains to the claims
under reexamination.56 Appropriate prior art includes only patents
and other printed publications.57
Within three months of the filing of a request, the Director of
Patents and Trademarks must determine if the filing raises a
“substantial new question of patentability.”58 The Federal Circuit
attempted to clarify this ambiguous standard, determining that a
question successfully traversed59 or one or more previously
considered references60 cannot form the basis for a substantial new
53

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–07 (2002).
35 U.S.C. § 301. Even though the language allows for a reexamination request at
“any” time, this has been construed to be limited to the enforceable life of the patent, or
the duration of the patent term plus six years. See MPEP, supra note 29, § 2211.
55
See 35 U.S.C. § 302. The commissioner may also commence a reexamination on his
or her own initiative although this rarely occurs. See Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, 37
C.F.R. § 1.520 (2003); MPEP, supra note 29, §§ 2212, 2239. In the first eight years that
the reexamination proceedings were in effect, the commissioner initiated less than one
percent of reexaminations. See Standard Havens Prods. v. Gencor Indus., 897 F.2d 511,
514 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
In addition to the threshold requirement of a substantial new question of
patentability, there must also be “compelling reasons” for the commissioner to order a
reexamination, such as concern about a patent in a substantial area of industry. See Dugie
Standeford, PTO Orders Reexamination of Y2K Fix Patent, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan.
7, 2000, at 4. Most recently, former commissioner Q. Todd Dickinson ordered a
reexamination of a computer software patent claiming a method of fixing Y2K glitches
after more than 700 cease-and-desist letters were sent by a patent holder to members of
the software industry. See id.
56
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.510(b)(2).
57
See 35 U.S.C. § 301; In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 856 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc); 37
C.F.R. § 1.510(a) (2002).
58
See 35 U.S.C. § 303 (2000).
59
See In re Recreative Techs. Corp., 83 F.3d 1394, 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
60
See In re Portola Packaging Inc., 110 F.3d 786, 791 (Fed. Cir. 1997). During the
initial examination of the patent in this case, the examiner raised the issue of anticipation
54
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question of patentability.
Congress, however, has recently
amended the standard such that a substantial new question may in
fact be raised based on previously considered art.61
Though the standard for a substantial new question might be in
flux, it is clear that only patents and printed publications may be
cited in requesting a reexamination.62 As a result, written requests
may only raise patentability questions based on anticipation and
obviousness. They may not raise any question requiring proof
other than a patent or printed publication, such as prior use,
eligible subject matter, on-sale bar, adequate disclosure, or
inequitable conduct.63 By limiting the evidence in a reexamination
request to patents and other publications, Congress attempted to
provide an inexpensive and quick method for challenging patent
validity.64
If a new question of patentability is found, reexamination
proceeds and the patent owner has a reasonable time to respond.65
If the patent owner does respond, the party requesting the
reexamination will then have the opportunity to reply to the
by the Hunter patent and obviousness in light of the Faulstich patent combined with two
other references. See id. at 787. The applicant successfully traversed these rejections, and
the patent subsequently issued. See id. During reexamination, the examiner rejected
claims as obvious based on the combination of Hunter and Faulstich. See id. The Federal
Circuit determined that combining previously-considered references in a manner not
considered during initial examination did not constitute a substantial new question of
patentability. See id. at 791.
61
See H.R. 2215, 107th Cong. (2001) (amending sections 303(a), ex parte
reexamination, and 312(a), inter partes reexamination, of title 35 to include “[t]he
existence of a substantial new question of patentability is not precluded by the fact that a
patent or printed publication was previously cited by or to the [PTO] or considered by the
[PTO]”).
62
A bill in the 107th Congress did attempt to expand the scope of inter partes
examination to permit introduction of “undocumented” prior art. See Patent
Reexamination Enhancement Act of 2001, H.R. 2231, 107th Cong. (2001); infra Part
II.B. This bill died in the House.
63
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.552(c) (2002); MPEP, supra note 29, §§ 2216, 2258.
64
See Quad Envtl. Tech. Corp. v. Union Sanitary Dist., 946 F.2d 870, 875 n.7 (Fed.
Cir. 1991); H.R. REP. NO. 1307, 96th Cong., at 4 (1980).
65
See 35 U.S.C. § 304 (2002). The reasonable period for response shall not be less
than two months. See id. A response from the patent owner may include a statement as
well as proposed amendments and new claims. See id. The patent owner, however, may
not broaden the scope of the claims or add new matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2003);
Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, PLC, 65 F.3d 1577, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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statement filed by the patent owner.66 If the patent owner does not
respond, a requester has no further right to participate in the action
beyond the filing of a request.
After the time for response and reply has expired, the patent is
examined in the same manner as initial examination of
applications.67 Claims subject to reexamination do not maintain
the presumption of validity conferred on issued patents.68 As they
are in initial examination, the claims are given the broadest reading
supported by the specification.69 Because of these factors, the
examiner is not bound by the “clear and convincing” evidence
standard that applies in civil litigation when patent validity is
challenged.70 Reexamination proceeds in the same manner as
examination—as an ex parte proceeding; thus, a third party
requesting reexamination is not permitted to participate, although
the requester is provided with copies of “Office actions” and
responses throughout the reexamination proceedings.71
A patent owner may appeal adverse decisions that arise during
reexamination through administrative and judicial avenues.72 In
addition to being prohibited from participating in the
reexamination, a third-party requester cannot appeal the denial of a
reexamination request nor can he or she seek review of the
examiner’s decision upon reexamination.73
66

See 35 U.S.C. § 304 (2003). The requester shall also have two months in which to
reply. See id.
67
See 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2000).
68
See In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 858 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). Because
reexamination functions to provide a mechanism for invalidating wrongfully issued
patents, it would be contrary to this purpose to presume validity. See id. at 857. Further,
reexamination should be viewed as distinct from litigation. See id.
69
See id. at 858.
70
See Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that the
preponderance of the evidence is the standard during reexamination).
71
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.550(g) (2002).
72
See 35 U.S.C. § 306 (2000). The owner may appeal an examiner’s decision to the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“BPAI”). See 35 U.S.C. § 134 (2003). From
the BPAI, the patent owner may appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or
may file a civil action in the District Court for the District of Columbia. See 25 U.S.C.
§ 141 (2003).
73
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 303(c), 306 (2002). The third-party requester may seek
reconsideration from the Commissioner upon denial of a reexamination request. See 37
C.F.R. § 1.515(c) (2002).
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B. Inter Partes Reexamination Proceedings
The AIPA created an alternative reexamination mechanism,
grafted onto the existing law while leaving the original
reexamination procedure in place.74 Chapter 31 of the act, which
forms the basis for the alternative mechanism, provides that “[a]ny
third-party requester at any time may file a request for inter partes
reexamination” by following the procedures and limitations of
§ 301,75 including being limited to prior-art objections based on
patents or printed publications.76
With respect to the actual filing of a request for reexamination,
the only difference between ex parte reexamination and inter partes
reexamination is that, in inter partes reexamination, the real party
in interest must be identified.77 An ex parte reexamination request,
on the other hand, may be filed in the name of “any person,”
including “attorneys representing a principal whose identity is not
disclosed to the PTO.”78 In both inter partes and ex parte
reexamination, following a request, the director makes a
determination whether a “substantial new question of
patentability” has been raised.79 If a substantial new question is
found, inter partes reexamination proceedings are conducted much
the same as ex parte reexamination, and the proceedings comport
with initial examination under 35 U.S.C. §§ 132–33, except for the
allowance of participation by the third-party requester.80
By utilizing the inter partes reexamination proceedings, the
third-party requester obtains “one opportunity to file written
comments addressing issues raised by the action of the Office or
the patent owner’s response thereto,” so long as filed in a timely

74

For details regarding ex parte reexamination, see supra Part II.A.
See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2003).
76
See 35 U.S.C. § 301. For a further description of § 301 and the other ex parte
reexamination procedures, see supra Part II.A.
77
See 35 U.S.C. § 311.
78
Syntex Inc. v. United States Patent and Trademark Office, 882 F.2d 1570, 1573 (Fed.
Cir. 1989).
79
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 303, 312.
80
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 313–14 (2002). One such similarity to ex parte reexamination is
the prohibition on the patent owner from making amendments that effectively enlarge the
scope of the claim. See id. § 314. In particular, § 132 provides for reexamination.
75
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manner.81 Also, the inter partes reexamination proceedings
promote the ability of the third-party requester to appeal, providing
appeal from an unfavorable decision in reexamination to the Board
of Patent Appeals and Interferences.82 As originally enacted, inter
partes reexamination limited the third-party requester’s appellate
avenues, even while providing greater appeal rights than for ex
parte reexamination.
Congress has recently remedied this
shortcoming by providing the same appellate avenues to both the
patentee and the third-party requester in an inter partes
reexamination, applicable to any reexamination requests filed on or
after November 29, 2002.83
The increase in opportunities for participation by the thirdparty requester, however, comes at a price. A third-party requester
is estopped from later questioning in litigation the validity of any
claim deemed valid during reexamination if the grounds for the
invalidity challenge were raised or could have been raised during
the reexamination proceedings.84 More threatening, however, is
the provision wherein a third-party requester is also estopped from
challenging any finding of fact made during the reexamination
proceedings, unless the fact is later proven erroneous based on
evidence that was unavailable at the time of reexamination.85
III. THE DIAGNOSIS
The reexamination system, even as modified by the addition of
inter partes reexamination and subsequent refinements, does not
accomplish the lofty goal, as intended by its authors and
supporters, of providing greater confidence in patent validity, nor
does it realize the later-voiced goal of reducing patent litigation.
81

35 U.S.C. § 314.
See id.
83
See 35 U.S.C. § 315.
84
See id. The third-party requester is not prevented from asserting invalidity based on
newly discovered prior art that was not available to the requester or the PTO at the time
of the reexamination. See id.
85
See S. 1948, 106th Cong. § 4607 (1999). This section has not yet been codified. In
fact, Congress was unsure of the validity of this section when the law was passed and
added a statement of severability at the end of this provision to ensure the continued
validity of the remainder of the legislation. See id.
82
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Coupled with the failure of the reexamination system itself, patent
invalidity is again becoming a great concern as the knowledge,
which serves as prior art, is increasingly decentralized.86
Technology is growing and changing rapidly, further diminishing
the probability that the PTO can maintain a solid grasp on all areas
of art. Patents are thus being granted that should have been
rejected, and confidence in the patent system is suffering.87
Reexamination, in large part due to its failings, is not used as
frequently as Congress had expected.88 Because it is not often
used, reexamination also does not fulfill the goal of reducing
patent litigation. Third parties are much more likely to wait for
litigation than to run back to the PTO.89 Litigation, however, is not
an efficient way to deal with patent validity, due to cost in dollars
and time, and the lack of scientific and technical expertise of
federal judges.90 Additionally, in this age of global economy, the
litigation scenario makes obtaining a U.S. patent less desirable to
foreign patentees, as foreign patentees may be unfamiliar with the
U.S. justice system or may be wary of actual or imagined bias
against foreigners.

86

Cf. In re Portola Packaging, Inc., 110 F.3d 786, 789 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting
Congress’ recognition that “holdings of patent invalidity by courts were mostly based on
prior art that was not before the PTO”).
87
See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036 (issued Aug. 22, 1995) (disclosing “[a] method
for inducing cats to exercise consist[ing] of directing a beam of invisible light produced
by a hand-held laser apparatus onto the floor or wall or other opaque surface in the
vicinity of the cat, then moving the laser so as to cause the bright pattern of light to move
in an irregular way fascinating to cats, and to any other animal with a chase instinct”);
U.S. Patent No. 6,004,596 (issued Dec. 21, 1999) (claiming a crustless peanut butter and
jelly sandwich).
88
See Allan M. Soobert, Breaking New Grounds in Administrative Revocation of U.S.
Patents: A Proposition for Opposition—And Beyond, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 63, 100–01 (1998). Congress expected more than 2,000 reexaminations
per year, but only a small fraction of that number is actuallyrequested each year. See id.
at 101. The number of reexaminations requested has risen from an average of 230 per
year, based on a study conducted in 1992, to approximately 350 per year more recently.
See id. at 101 n.184. The number of reexaminations increased from 251 in 1989 to 392 in
1992. See 1992 COMM’R OF PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS ANNUAL REPORT 30, 59.
89
See Soobert, supra note 88, at 102.
90
See Bauz, supra note 24, at 945.
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A. The Disease of the Ex Parte Reexamination Provisions
Most critics of the reexamination provisions, many writing
prior to the passage of the new inter partes reexamination system,
agree on the main weaknesses of the system as it existed prior to
December 1999. Inadequate third-party participation mechanisms,
overly narrow substantive grounds upon which to base a request
for reexamination, lack of meaningful legal effect especially in the
case of concurrent litigation, and biased procedural mechanisms
have all been cited as contributing to the weakened state of
reexamination.91 Commentators on the inter partes reexamination
proceedings are no less critical, in large part because inter partes
reexamination merely appends an equally faulty provision on top
of the ex parte provisions, which introduced problems of its own
and relieves only one of the problems associated with ex parte
reexamination at best.92
1. Inadequate Third-Party Participation
Lack of third-party participation has been the most criticized
aspect of the ex parte reexamination procedure, and incidentally,
the only one addressed by the reforms in the AIPA.93 In ex parte
reexamination, a third-party requester has, at most, two
opportunities to participate. One opportunity is the ability to file a
request for reexamination.94 If the patent owner files a reply, the
requester may then file a response to the patent owner’s
submission.95 Patent owners therefore often forego this reply,
leaving the third-party requester with no participation beyond the

91

See, e.g., id. at 953–54, 960–61. Among factors commentators frequently listed as
weakening the reexamination procedure is the loss of the presumption of validity. See,
e.g., id. at 955. The author, however, instead agrees with the court in In re Etter, 756
F.2d 852, 858 (Fed. Cir. 1985), which explained that to permit this presumption would be
contrary to the purpose of reexamination.
92
See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Inter Partes Patent Reexamination, 10 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 481, 483 (2000) (stating that in creating inter partes
reexamination, Congress “has enacted a mongrel procedure that is incoherent in its vision
and unbalanced in its incentives structure”).
93
See Janis, supra note 15, at 69–70.
94
See 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
95
See 35 U.S.C. § 304 (2003).

OSENGA FORMAT

2003]

12/9/2003 2:25 PM

RETHINKING REEXAMINATION REFORM

233

original request.96 Further, a patent owner may effectively
preempt even this minimal participation by filing a reexamination
request of his or her own.97
The third-party requester may not have any filings beyond
those considered by the PTO, nor may he or she participate in
interviews with the examiner.98 More importantly, the third-party
requester has no opportunity to appeal an unfavorable
determination, either at the threshold level of determining the
existence of a substantial new question or of the results from an
ensuing reexamination.99
While reexamination was intended to be a curative mechanism
to fix a problem that occurred during an initial ex parte
examination, it is frustrating for the third-party requester to be
unable to participate. Litigation, on the other hand, offers the third
party a chance to participate at every level of the invalidity
determination, where he or she is able to counter every argument
made by the patentee in support of patent validity. Further,
litigation provides the third-party requester with an appellate
process equal to that of the patentee. While the negative aspects of
litigation include high costs in dollars and time spent, partial
control over the process and an opportunity to appeal often
outweigh the downside of litigation costs.
2. Narrow Substantive Grounds
Another oft-voiced concern is that the grounds for which a
reexamination can be requested are too narrow for widespread use,
thus encouraging parties to pursue all possible grounds for
invalidation in court.100 The statute only permits reexamination for
questions of novelty and nonobviousness in light of new prior
art.101 While it is true that the decentralization of prior art is one
aggravating factor calling for reexamination, it is also true that a
96

See Janis, supra note 15, at 71 n.313.
See id. at 70.
98
See id. at 71.
99
See id. at 71–72.
100
See, e.g., Janis, supra note 15, at 53–54 (stating that the scope of reexamination is
limited to prior art patents or printed publications); Bauz, supra note 24, at 953.
101
See id.
97
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number of patents would have been invalidated had the PTO had
access to information other than “documented” prior art.102
In the secrecy that had traditionally surrounded the patent
prosecution process, persons having information relevant to onsale or prior use activities have not realized the importance of this
data until after the patent issues. Because of the prior art
requirement, areas that cannot be challenged include questions of
utility, on-sale bars, adequate disclosure,103 inventorship, public
use, and inequitable conduct.104 Justifications for this limitation
include protecting the patent owner from undue procedural
nightmares, as well as conserving scarce PTO resources.105
Though in effect, this limitation creates a reexamination
proceeding that is “biased against the goal of providing a litigation
alternative,” as there are a number of potentially invalid patents
that can now only be corrected through litigation.106 Further, this
limitation only scratches the surface as a curative mechanism to
prevent the exploitation of invalid patents.
3. Lack of Meaningful Legal Effect
There are two components to this issue: first, unless the patent
is altered or invalidated during reexamination, there is “no binding
legal effect”;107 second, litigation and reexamination may take
place concurrently. Parties also favor litigation because of these

102

See Janis, supra note 15, at 58 (citing In re Recreative Techs. Corp., 83 F.3d 1394
(Fed. Cir. 1996)).
103
The term “adequate disclosure” pertains generally to the requirements imposed by 35
U.S.C. § 112.
104
To include inequitable conduct in the list of grounds that are not permitted in
reexamination may be slightly misleading, as it can not be considered during primary
examination. To be able to raise this ground for invalidation/unenforceability in a nonlitigation proceeding, however, would provide an additional incentive to use
reexamination.
105
See Janis, supra note 15, at 55–56.
106
See id. at 55 (“Not surprisingly, the stark discontinuity between the substantive scope
of reexamination and the substantive scope of validity litigation dissuades third parties
from choosing reexamination over litigation, or precludes them from doing so altogether
depending upon the nature of their invalidity evidence.” (citations omitted)).
107
See Bauz, supra note 24, at 954.
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concerns. In litigation, a decision will be final and the res judicata
and issue preclusion standards are well known and understood.108
While it is clear that a court’s determination of patent invalidity
is binding on the PTO,109 the binding effects of the PTO’s
conclusions during reexamination are less clear. The statute seems
to clarify that the PTO may cancel any claim deemed unpatentable,
which is a decision that becomes final upon exhaustion of
appeals.110 The lack of clarity involves determinations of validity
by a court or by the PTO. Litigation, offering a standard basis of
res judicata and issue preclusion, often appears a more attractive
alternative.
A related concern is the possibility of a concurrent litigation
and reexamination proceeding. Throughout the legislative history
of reexamination, a number of proposals have been raised to
prevent this occurrence.111 Congress, however, has chosen to
remain silent on this issue, assuming the courts would use their
discretionary powers to grant stays.112 Because of the differing
evidentiary standards between reexamination and litigation, it is
even possible to obtain different outcomes.
Because a
reexamination proceeding and a lawsuit may run concurrently and
there is a lack of binding effect between the two, the possibility of
excess cost is great.
4. Biased Procedural Measures
A number of the procedural measures that make up the
reexamination statute are biased in such a way to make the parties
consider litigation as more favorable than reexamination. The
threshold requirement of a substantial new question of patentability
was designed, along with the high filing fee, to protect the patentee
108

Cf. id. (stating that “the reexamination proceeding lacks meaningful legal effect like
res judicata or collateral estoppel”).
109
See MPEP, supra note 29, § 2286; cf. Ethicon, Inc., v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1429
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (opining that “if a court finds a patent invalid, and that decision is either
upheld on appeal or not appealed, the PTO may discontinue its reexamination”).
110
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 306, 307(a) (2002).
111
See Janis, supra note 15, at 78–79. Proposals range from requiring that all patent
validity issues be first taken to the PTO to requiring a stay of whichever was filed later.
Id.
112
See id. at 79–80.
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from unnecessary harassment.113
In practice, however, the
reexamination requests are often rubber-stamped by the examiners
because a substantial new question standard is too vague, and
examiners believe that it is better to err on the side of overinclusion.114 This bias would seem to cut in favor of the thirdparty requester because it is likely that his or her request for a
reexamination will be granted. In addition, the loss of a
presumption of validity in reexamination favors the requester. The
bias of non-participation, however, weighs heavily in favor of the
patentee.115 Thus, both parties have significant reasons to favor
litigation. In litigation, the only bias is the presumption of patent
validity, which is often a presumption that is not given much
weight by judges and juries.
B. The False Panacea
In addition to the specter of patent invalidity that Congress
originally sought to cure by implementing reexamination, one
specified goal of the new legislation is also to “reduce patent
litigation.”116 Reduction in patent litigation is a stated purpose of
the amendments to reexamination, with the law aimed at making
reexamination a more attractive means for challenging patent
validity than legal action. But even if the addition of inter partes
reexamination in some way cures a deficiency of ex parte
reexamination by permitting third-party participation, it is certainly
not the cure-all that is needed. Further, it is highly questionable
that this legislation will be able to abate any of the symptoms.
First, the new legislation carries forward many of the negative
aspects of the existing ex parte reexamination into the inter partes
procedures. Second, the requirement that a real party in interest
must be identified for inter partes reexamination is a disincentive
for smaller parties to utilize this mechanism. Third, there exists
some ambiguity in the legislation as to the level of participation of
the third-party requester, including the right to submit newlydiscovered art during the reexamination proceedings and the right
113
114
115
116

See id. at 45.
See id. at 48.
See Soobert, supra note 88, at 101–02.
H.R. 1907, 106th Cong. (1999).
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to participate in interviews with the examiner. Finally, the cost
incurred by the estoppel provisions is likely to be high enough to
discourage all but the bravest from using the provision.
1. Carry-Overs from Ex Parte Reexamination
The inter partes reexamination procedure, while addressing (at
least in part) the lack of third-party participation and the lack of
meaningful legal effect, retains the same overly-narrow bases on
which to support a request for reexamination that were previously
present. The lack of meaningful judicial effect has also been
partially addressed. By introducing legal and factual estoppel in a
situation where the third-party requester has somewhat limited
participation, however, does not improve the problem. In fact, it is
quite possible that a third-party requester will now run into court
rather than take any unnecessary chances with the PTO.117
2. Identification of the Real Party in Interest
The inter partes reexamination procedure, unlike the ex parte
provisions, requires that the real party in interest must be
identified.118 This is an area of concern for small companies who
previously had used reexamination as an alternative to litigation.119
By filing a reexamination request under the name of a lawyer, a
small company can raise issues of patent validity without fear of
being run into court on infringement allegations by bigger
companies who are more economically able to bear the costs of
litigation.120 The retention of ex parte reexamination proceedings
still allows the small company to air its concerns in the same
manner; however, the requester does not get the benefit of being
able to participate.

117

See infra Part III.B.4.
See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2002).
119
Cf. Janis, supra note 92, at 489 n.32 (“One can imagine, for example, a small
company that fears an infringement suit from a large patent owner, and would like to test
the patent in a relatively inexpensive reexamination forum without attracting attention to
the possible infringement.”).
120
See id.
118
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3. Ambiguous Level of Participation by Third Party
While the inter partes reexamination proceedings make clear
that the third-party requester may submit a filing in response to any
action by the PTO or the patentee, the law provides no clarity
about other activities. Some specific questions, left up to the PTO,
include whether a third party may participate in interviews with the
examiner (or further, whether the third party must be invited to
participate) and whether the third-party requester may raise further
questions of patentability once the reexamination proceedings have
started.121
With respect to the extent of third-party participation, the PTO,
in the background to the Rules to Implement Optional Inter Partes
Reexamination Proceedings (“Rules”), specifically states that
participation of a third party will be limited to “minimize the costs
and other effects of reexamination requests on patentees.”122 The
third-party requester may file one response for each response of the
patent owner, limited to issues raised in the Office action or the
patent owner’s response.123 Rather than dealing with the complex
issues that would surround interviews, the Rules completely
prohibit interviews in inter partes reexamination.124
With respect to additional questions of patentability, the Rules
permit citations to prior art by the patent owner or the third-party
requester to be entered in the examination file.125 This prior art is
limited to prior art that is “necessary to rebut a finding of fact by
[an] examiner” or “rebut a response of the patent owner,” or which
becomes available or known for the first time to the third-party
requester after the filing of the reexamination request.126 Citations

121

Cf. Soobert, supra note 88, at 111 (suggesting a new procedure that weighs, among
other considerations, whether and how much third parties should be permitted to
participate and whether third parties should be able to appeal).
122
Rules to Implement Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Proceedings, 65 Fed. Reg.
76,756, 76,756 (Dec. 7, 2000) [hereinafter Rules].
123
See id. at 76,780 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.947).
124
See id. at 76,781 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.955).
125
See id. at 76,778 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.902).
126
Id. at 76,780 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.948).
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by other parties may not be entered until the inter partes
reexamination is terminated.127
4. Estoppel Provisions
The highest cost exacted by the inter partes reexamination
procedure comes from the estoppel rules.128 The third-party
requester may not question the validity of any claim deemed valid
during the reexamination in later litigation if the challenge of
invalidity was raised or could have been raised during the
reexamination proceedings.129 Further, the third-party requester
may not challenge any finding of fact made during the
reexamination proceedings unless that fact is later proven to be
false based on evidence unavailable at the time of the
reexamination.130 This estoppel, combined with limited avenues of
appeal, is a great enough detriment to force third parties to use
either the flawed ex parte reexamination, or more likely, to go into
court.
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Both the European Patent Office and the Japanese Patent
Office engage in post-grant opposition procedures, whereby third
parties have the opportunity to come forward and challenge the
validity of recently issued patents. Further, Europe and Japan also
offer other methods by which to raise issues of invalidity.
A. European Opposition
The European Patent Convention (“EPC”) governs a
centralized system for granting a single patent effective in various
127

See id. at 76,778 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.902).
It should also be noted that the monetary cost of inter partes reexamination is also
much greater than ex parte reexamination. The estimated average cost of an inter partes
reexamination is $8,800, compared to $2,520 for ex parte reexamination. See id. at
76,757. This cost, however, is de minimis when compared to the costs involved in
litigation. Note that the costs listed here are just the filing fees for reexamination. See 37
C.F.R. § 1.20 (2002).
129
See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (2003).
130
See S. 1948, 106th Cong. § 4607 (1999). This section has not yet been codified.
128
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European states.131 Opposition against a European patent must be
initiated within nine months of publication of the grant of a patent
in the European Patent Bulletin.132 Any person, exclusive of the
patent owner, is entitled to file a notice of opposition.133 The
notice of opposition must include a statement concerning the
grounds on which the opposition is based as well as an indication
of the facts, evidence, and arguments presented in support of these
grounds.134 Admissible grounds for opposition include lack of
novelty, lack of inventive step, lack of industrial application,
ineligible subject matter, non-patentability, inadequate disclosure,
and inadmissible amendment.135
The opposition proceedings are conducted by the European
Patent Office (“EPO”) Opposition Division consisting of three
examiners, two of whom did not participate in the initial
examination.136 The notice of opposition is sent to the patent
owner, who may reply with observations or amendments.137 After
this optional reply, the Opposition Division examines the patent,
basing its decision on the arguments set forth in the notice of
opposition as well as evidence taken during the proceedings.138
Evidence includes written documents, not limited to printed prior
art and patents, and also may include the oral testimony of parties,
witnesses, and experts.139
The opposition proceedings will result in either the revocation
of the patent or the maintenance of a patent.140 Either the patent
131

See European Patent Convention, Oct. 5 1973, 13 I.L.M. 270 [hereinafter EPC],
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 675 (Marshall A.
Leaffer ed., 2d ed. 1997).
132
See EPC, supra note 131, art. 99(1).
133
See id. An applicant was previously able to file an opposition against his own patent.
See Case G 01/84, Mobil Oil/Opposition by Proprietor, E.P.O. 10/1985, 299. This
position has now been reversed, and an applicant may not oppose his own patent. See
Case G 09/93, Peugeot & Citroen/Opposition by Patent Proprietor, E.P.O. 12/1994, 891.
134
Cf. EPC, supra note 131, art. 99(1) (stating that a “written reasoned statement” must
be filed).
135
See id. arts. 52–57, 100.
136
See id. art. 19.
137
See id. art. 100, rule 57a.
138
See id. art. 101.
139
See id.
140
See id. art. 102. The patent may be maintained in unamended or amended form. See
id.
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owner or the requester of the opposition may appeal on factual or
legal grounds any adverse decision by the Opposition Division to
the EPO Board of Appeal.141
Oppositions, while not used extensively, are prevalent enough
to allow those who participate to become proficient. Furthermore,
the fact that the opposition proceedings are used is some proof of
their believed value. In 2000, the number of patent examinations
requested of the EPO was 45,864.142 Of this number, 27,523
patents were granted.143 Just over seven percent of this number
(i.e., 1,998 patents) were opposed in that same time period.144
B. Other European Methods to Challenge Validity
In many European countries, third parties may also challenge
the validity of an EPO patent through a method such as national
revocation proceedings.145 These decisions are only effective in
the particular contracting state where the proceedings occurred.
C. Japanese Oppositions
The Japanese Patent Office (“JPO”) consists of examiners,
charged with determining the patentability of an application, as
well as trial examiners, who hear various trials within the JPO.146
Because the Japanese courts have no jurisdiction regarding the
validity of patents, the trial examiners hear issues of validity after
issuance in addition to issues regarding an examiner’s
determination of unpatentability.147
Any person may file an opposition to a Japanese patent within
six months after the publication of the issued patent.148 The
141

See id. art. 106.
See EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, FACTS AND FIGURES 2000, at 16 (2001), available at
http://www.european-patent-office.org/epo/facts_figures/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2003).
143
See id.
144
See id.
145
See Soobert, supra note 88, at 151 n.444.
146
See Patent Law, Law No. 121 of 1959, §§ 47, 137(1), as amended (Jap.), translated
in JAPANESE LAWS RELATING TO INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY (Japanese Patent Office trans.,
1996) [hereinafter Japanese Patent Law].
147
See id. §§ 121, 123.
148
See Soobert, supra note 88, at 165 (citing Japanese Patent Law § 113).
142

OSENGA FORMAT

242

12/9/2003 2:25 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 14:217

written opposition must include a statement of the grounds for
opposition as well as supporting evidence.149 A Japanese patent
may be opposed on nearly any ground for which an examiner may
determine an application to be unpatentable.150 Opposition may be
based on evidence of activities, as well as printed prior art
material.151
A chief trial examiner will forward the notice of opposition to
the patentee, who then has a period in which to reply, to amend the
specification or drawings by narrowing the claims, correcting
errors or clarifying ambiguity.152 After the period for reply, a
group of three trial examiners is convened to examine the
evidence.153 Documentary evidence is prevalent, but testimonial
evidence may be presented upon motion.154 At the conclusion of
the evidence, the trial examiners render an opinion as to the
opposition.155
A decision that is unfavorable to the patentee may be appealed
to the Tokyo High Court; however, favorable rulings are not
appealable, and recourse consists of further opposition, if the time
period has not lapsed, or alternate revocation proceedings.156
D. Other Japanese Methods to Challenge Validity
Japan has a number of alternative avenues with which to
challenge the validity of a patent. These methods include a “trial
for invalidation of a patent,” which is an inter partes proceeding
before a group of three trial examiners.157 Most commonly
demanded by alleged infringers, the trial for invalidation of a
patent is based largely on oral testimony.158 Again, in this
149

See id. (citing Japanese Patent Law § 115).
See id. at 163 (citing Japanese Patent Law § 113). Some of these grounds include
lack of novelty, lack of industrial application, lack of inventive step, improper claims, or
insufficient disclosure. See id. at 158.
151
See id. at 163–64.
152
See id. at 166 (citing Japanese Patent Law §§ 115, 120).
153
See id. (citing Japanese Patent Law § 114).
154
See id. at 166–67 (citing Japanese Patent Law § 117).
155
See id. at 167 (citing Japanese Patent Law § 114).
156
See id.
157
See id. at 167 n.530.
158
See id.
150

OSENGA FORMAT

2003]

12/9/2003 2:25 PM

RETHINKING REEXAMINATION REFORM

243

proceeding, a patent will be invalidated for largely the same
reasons that an initial patent may be refused.159
Japanese patents may also be amended after issuance if the
patentee demands a “trial for correction.”160 This ex parte
proceeding is typically conducted before three trial examiners.161
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Numerous commentators have chimed in on the subject of
reexamination reform. The many proposed solutions offered by
the scholars, however, are insufficient to cure the disease that has
eaten away at the skeleton that supported the inception of the
reexamination provision. Other suggestions are so far-fetched and
academic, making the solution a scholarly exercise. Instead, this
Article submits that a pragmatic approach is the key to actual
reexamination reform. The scheme must carefully consider the
goals advanced in justification of this procedure and reflect a
proceeding that is the result of carefully balancing these goals.
Further, the scheme must balance the interests of all parties
involved: the patentee, the competitor, the investor, and the public.
A. Corrective Surgery: Proposals to Reform Reexamination
Because of the complexity of issues, the divergent goals, and
the mess that has been made of the existing reexamination
provisions, it is unlikely that mere reform is going to be sufficient.
Like many of the proposed solutions, the AIPA reexamination
reform provisions simply bandage the problem or at best provide
corrective surgery. Rather than looking into the problems that
exist in ex parte reexamination, excising those problems, and
inserting more effective solutions, Congress merely covered
existing procedures with new ones. This is simply inadequate. To
best solve the problems enumerated above, more cutting of the
existing procedures is required so that the reform provisions fill in
the gaps rather than just lay on top of a flawed system.
159
160
161

See id.
See id.
See id.
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B. Radical Amputation: Proposals to Dispose of Reexamination
Proceedings
While it is painfully clear that mere cosmetic changes to the
current reexamination provisions are insufficient to meet the
above-enunciated goals, the radical changes proposed by many
commentators are also ineffective. Based on the great initiative
required to pass even the smallest legislation, a complete overhaul
of the patent system is not likely to occur any time soon. Instead, a
better solution would be to propose a system that addresses all
concerns, yet still maintains enough familiarity with the current
system so that detractors will not balk merely because the proposed
system looks too different.
One example of a proposed system that looks too different is
opposition, similar to that used in Europe or Japan.
Recommendations for the implementation of an opposition system
in the United States date as far back as 1936.162 In more recent
years, the subject of opposition has again been raised by a number
of respected voices within the field of patent law. Both the
American Intellectual Property Law Association (“AIPLA”) and
the Intellectual Property Section of the ABA have made public
resolutions encouraging the creation of an opposition
proceeding.163 Opposition proceedings have also been hailed by
noted professors such as Harold Wegner and Robert Merges.164
Finally, there have been empirical studies, the results of which
show judicial favor for the development of opposition
proceedings.165
162

See Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J.
759, 764 n.28 (1999).
163
See id.
164
See id. (citing Harold C. Wegner, Patent Law Simplification and the Geneva
Convention, 14 AIPLA Q.J. 154, 200–01 (1986)); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six
Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent
System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 610–15 (1999).
165
One study, conducted by Nard himself, polled federal district court judges. See Nard,
supra note 162, at 769. Of the 204 respondents, 93 favored the implementation of
opposition proceedings, 45 opposed, and 66 had no opinion. See id. app. A 1995 study
by Lawrence G. Kastriner indicated that of the forty-two patent lawyers who responded,
ninety percent stated they were in favor of the implementation of opposition proceedings.
See id. at 796 n.172.
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Among the justifications that Professor Craig Allen Nard cites
for the implementation of opposition proceedings are (1) most
prior art references asserted during litigation were not considered
during prosecution before the PTO and (2) the probability of a
finding of invalidity was greater when the patent was challenged
with uncited prior art rather than with cited art.166 These
justifications, however, fail to explain why reexamination, which
must be based on uncited prior art, is an underutilized mechanism
with which to challenge patent validity.
C. A Realistic Approach to Revamping the System
As evidenced by the above discussion, it is clear that any
attempt to reformulate the reexamination procedure must be both
goal driven and goal defined. Two goals that should be addressed
in reforming the reexamination system are (1) providing a curative
mechanism for invalid patents and (2) serving as an attractive
alternative to litigation of patent validity. Another goal should be
providing a scheme that equally protects the inventor, the
competitor, the investor, and the public. Finally, while complete
harmonization with international systems may not provide the best
scheme for the United States, the interests of those engaging in the
global economy must be considered.
As it was at the enactment of the initial reexamination
procedure, one important goal is to provide a mechanism for
effectively challenging the validity of an issued patent. One
commentator suggests that a curative mechanism may be less
necessary at this time because the creation of the Federal Circuit
has brought about an increased adherence to the presumption of
patent validity.167 But the need is not gone; the audience has
simply changed. The audience is no longer the judiciary to be
convinced of patent validity; instead, the audience is the inventing
and investing public because patent validity is important for a
number of economic reasons. This goal of comforting the
investing public is mentioned in the legislative history of the initial
166

See id. at 768 (citing a study by John R. Allison and Mark A. Lemley, published in
their article Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185,
234 (1998)).
167
See Janis, supra note 15, at 26.
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reexamination mechanism. However, this goal seems to be
inadequately met by that procedure, has not proven to be the
subject of much commentary, and requires more scrutiny than it
has thus far received.
A second important, and somewhat related, goal is to provide a
cost-effective method to challenge validity, or in other words, an
attractive alternative to litigation. This goal, too, was mentioned
during the enactment of the initial reexamination legislation, but it
has not been met by the current reexamination scheme.
Third, the procedure should take into account the balance of
equities and resources and must address the needs of the inventor,
the investor, the competitor, and the public. This goal will require
a fine balance, as the motivations of these groups are often
divergent, if not wholly contradictory.
With respect to
reexamination, an inventor’s interest is largely to enjoy quiet title
to his or her patent and to avoid undue harassment. A competitor’s
interest, however, lies in the provision of a useful method of
challenging an invalid, overly broad patent, especially as the
competitor is likely to have the best information to do so. The
interest of the investor is having security in the metes and bounds
of a patent, as well as quiet enjoyment upon assignation. It is in all
parties’ interest to have an expedient proceeding as well as a clear
understanding of finality.
Finally, the procedure must either harmonize with international
intellectual property proceedings, or at least, must not discourage
participation by inventors also participating in the global economy.
The trend in international patent law is toward harmonization. Yet
some aspects of American patent law remain unique. Because
some of these unique aspects are due to the American way of life,
such as provisions that protect the garage inventor, it is important
to consider ways to harmonize that do not disrupt these interests.
If harmonization is not necessary, then the least that will suffice
will be to provide a fair playing field for inventors and investors
from all countries.
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D. A Proposed Method of Patent Invalidation
Renaming the mechanism from “reexamination” to “patent
invalidation” calls attention to the fact that the proceeding is no
longer a mimicry of the original examination. The functional
points of the proposed plan include a patent invalidation board, a
procedure for requesting a patent invalidation, the workings of a
patent invalidation proceeding, and the legal effects of the patent
invalidation determination. A number of comments that addressed
the PTO’s proposed rules of 1995 share similar thoughts to a
number of these proposals. These comments, as well as the PTO’s
responses, are discussed below.
1. The Patent Invalidation Board
Within the PTO, a group of patent attorneys should be hired to
form the patent invalidation board.
The members of the
invalidation board would have no duties outside of their function
on the board, which would include granting requests for
invalidation proceedings and serving as administrative arbiters
during invalidation proceedings. The creation of this board would
serve a number of purposes. First, concerns have been raised that
examiners’ limited knowledge of law is insufficient for their
participation in invalidation if the procedure is to include
evidentiary support beyond the prior art references familiar to
examiners. The proposed solution, as detailed below, pairs an
invalidation board member—a patent lawyer—with an examiner
so that greater knowledge will be available to the examiner.
Second, there is concern that examiners, because reexamination
occurs so infrequently, do not gain sufficient expertise in the
procedure. Because the invalidation board would be a small group
and collectively would be involved in all invalidation proceedings,
this expertise in invalidation can then be shared with the examiner,
who would bring expertise in patentability and technology to the
team. Third, this solution would leave the best examiners in the
examining group, unlike some previous proposals calling for the
creation of a reexamination board composed of examiners of
superior skill.
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One comment submitted in response to rules proposed in 1995
(in anticipation of reexamination reform that eventually did not
pass) called for the examiner with the greatest legal and other skills
given the complexity of the issue to be assigned to inter partes
reexamination.168 Two other comments called for a trio of
examiners and legal specialists to handle reexamination.169 The
PTO’s response to these comments, when promulgating the 2000
rules, indicates that a special group, compromised of legal
advisors, may be created to oversee the reexamination by an
examiner.170 As of December 2000, the PTO was still considering
this option.171 With respect to the panel of examiners, the PTO is
considering a panel review of the examiner’s reexamination
determination prior to the issuance of the reexamination
certificate.172
The above-proposed patent invalidation board goes further than
to create a group of reexamination legal specialists that will
oversee reexamination. Instead, each reexamination would be
supervised directly by the examiner or invalidation board member
team. The patent invalidation board would act in a supervisory
role, much as the group suggested by the PTO, but would also act
on a more individual basis and as an administrative arbiter within a
particular reexamination case. This is required because the patent
invalidation proceedings as detailed below would likely require
more legal expertise on a regular basis due to evidentiary and
estoppel issues.
2. Requesting a Patent Invalidation Proceeding
A request for patent invalidation may only be filed in the
eighteen months following the grant of the patent, unless the
patentee has brought an infringement suit against a party or has
168

See Rules to Implement Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Proceedings, 65 Fed.
Reg. 18,154, 18,157 (Apr. 6, 2000). Although the 1995 bill does not speak of inter partes
reexamination, it was the precursor for the current inter partes reexamination, and will be
addressed as such for ease.
169
See id.
170
See id. at 18,158.
171
See Rules, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,756, 76,758 (Dec. 7, 2000).
172
See Rules to Implement Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Proceedings, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 18,158.
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sufficiently created a reasonable fear of an infringement suit that a
party has filed for declaratory judgment. If a patent infringement
issue is before a court, either as a result of a patent owner suing for
infringement or an alleged infringer suing for a determination of
non-infringement, a request for patent invalidation may be filed at
any time. Of course, a patent infringement action may only be
brought in court during the enforceable life of the patent. This
provision provides the patent owner with a period of quiet
enjoyment after eighteen months, unless the patent owner chooses
to open up the courthouse door himself or herself. This further
prevents filings purely for harassment purposes after eighteen
months. The inventor or patent owner’s interest in quieting
harassment is balanced against the competitor’s interest in being
able to challenge a possibly invalid patent based on information
most likely possessed by him or her.
A patent invalidation proceeding may only be initiated by a
third party. This modification prevents patent owners from filing a
request to preempt a request filed by a competitor. The third-party
requester of the patent invalidation may raise any grounds on
which a patent may be found invalid or unenforceable, including
anticipation, obviousness, on-sale bar, public use, inventorship
problems, inequitable conduct, and inadequate disclosure. The
grounds must be particularly alleged and accompanied by
supporting evidence. In the case of anticipation and obviousness,
supporting evidence shall include the relevant prior art as well as a
clear statement of the pertinence of the references. For other
grounds, evidence shall include a clear statement of alleged
activity as well as brief affidavit testimony in support thereof. This
represents an important balance between the investor, whose
interest lies in securing a valuable property interest, and the
competitor, who should not need to fear suit for infringing an
invalid or overly broad patent.
Requests for invalidation would be forwarded to the patent
invalidation board, which would determine whether a question of
patentability, or more succinctly, invalidity, exists.
The
determination shall be made within one month. Because this is one
of only two duties that the board has, the expedient timing is
feasible. Also, because the determination is made so quickly, this
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represents one improvement over litigating the matter. If the board
determines that there is a question that should be explored, then a
patent invalidation proceeding will begin. If the board determines
that the filing of the request for patent invalidation was frivolous or
done in order to harass the patentee, the board may suggest that
Rule 11 sanctions173 be considered by the district court where the
case lies. Further, the patent invalidation board’s determination
that a question of patentability exists and the initiation of patent
invalidation proceeding would cause an automatic stay of all
pending litigation involving the patent. While stays are frequently
requested and granted at this time, this procedural point must be
codified so that it is universally followed.
If the patent invalidation board determines that there is no
reasonable question of invalidity, then the requester may appeal
this determination to the district court where infringement
litigation is pending or, if no litigation is pending, to a district court
with proper jurisdiction and venue. Because the determination of
an invalidity question is essentially an application of particular
facts to the law and because the PTO’s level of expertise is high,
the standard of review should be one of deference similar to that of
informal agency fact finding.
Patent invalidation board
determinations, then, would be subject to reversal if the court
determines the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
the board’s discretion.
In the comment period for the 1995 rules, one observation
suggested that the PTO should include affidavits in the prior art
analysis.174 In response, the PTO reiterated the findings of a 1992
Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform, holding that the
PTO is an inappropriate forum for addressing areas of invalidity
beyond those based on documentary prior art, largely because of
the mishaps that occurred during proceedings under the Dann
amendments.175 So long as this mindset is maintained, it is
unlikely that any curative mechanism will ever be able to fulfill the
173

See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
See Rules to Implement Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Proceedings, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 18,158.
175
See id. (citing ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PATENT LAW REFORM, REPORT TO THE
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 117 (Aug. 1992)).
174

OSENGA FORMAT

2003]

12/9/2003 2:25 PM

RETHINKING REEXAMINATION REFORM

251

dual goals of increasing patent validity and decreasing patent
validity litigation. Rather than looking to the Dann amendments as
a reason to prohibit expanding the reexamination proceedings, it
would be more instructive to view the Dann amendments as a first
draft or a teaching tool. Instead of simply avoiding the problem,
lessons should be learned from the mistakes that ensued. The
proposed invalidation proceedings outlined in this Article take into
account the concerns raised by the Dann amendments and build
from those mistakes.
3. The Patent Invalidation Proceeding
Patent invalidation proceedings would be conducted by a team
composed of a member of the patent invalidation board and the
examiner who conducted the original examination of the patent. If
the original examiner is unavailable, a suitable alternative would
be selected by the PTO, as is currently done for reexaminations.
Any significant splits of opinion between the examiner and the
board member would be resolved by the entire patent invalidation
board.
For a case involving only prior art, the case would proceed
with Office actions and responses permitted by both parties. If it is
determined that an interview would hasten along the process, then
both the patentee and the requester may attend and participate.
Any new art that is discovered during the pendency of the patent
invalidation proceeding must be presented to the examiner. Once a
third-party requester has initiated an invalidation proceeding, it
would be unfair to allow the requester to sandbag the patent owner.
If a third party becomes aware of additional prior art after an
invalidation proceeding is complete, however, a subsequent
request for invalidation may be filed on the basis of this art, but the
request must also be accompanied with a declaration that the party
was not aware of the art during the previous proceeding and a
statement of why this information was not available earlier. This
provision serves to prevent excess harassment of a patent owner
and promotes the general interest of expedience.
For cases involving affidavit evidence, the team may make a
decision on the affidavits—and counter-affidavits—alone, as a
matter similar to summary judgment. If it is determined that there
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is a material issue of fact, then the team may permit abbreviated
discovery in the form of depositions and interrogatories of the
witnesses covering issues raised during the request. Hearings may
be permitted by the team, and in any case, a full record should be
developed.
Decisions of the patent invalidation team may be appealed by
either the patentee or the requester to the Board of Patent
Interferences and Appeals (“BPAI”), which would make a
determination based upon the record developed. Decisions of the
BPAI may be appealed back to the district court where litigation
was stayed, or if no litigation is pending, to a district court with
appropriate jurisdiction and venue. The district court may handle
the appeal by reviewing the record for error, by hearing oral
arguments, or by reopening the issue to receive further evidence or
testimony. Because the record has been created in full, it would be
sufficient to make that determination on the record unless an error
has been made by the invalidation team in not hearing evidence.
The PTO has already addressed the issue of creating a full
record for the purpose of appeal. With respect to inter partes
reexamination, the PTO will “direct the examiner to make a
complete record of the reasons for allowing or rejecting a claim at
various stages.”176 This policy needs to be strengthened in the case
of patent invalidation proceedings and needs to include all
documentary and testimony evidence that the examiner took into
account in reaching a decision in order for the process to function
smoothly at the appellate level.
4. Legal Effects of Patent Invalidation Proceedings
A patent, or any part therein, found invalid during patent
invalidation proceedings is to be treated by all courts as invalid
after the exhaustion of possible appeals. Any patent found valid
during patent invalidation proceedings shall be held as valid in the
district court where the infringement case is held. Further, a patent
found valid may not be challenged on the same bases by any other
parties in the absence of different evidence.
176

See Rules to Implement Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Proceedings, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 18,158.
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The final determination of invalidity based on a patent
invalidation proceeding provides a level of certainty to all players
involved without denying the patentee any rights he or she already
has. If the invention had been found to be unpatentable during the
initial examination period, he or she would be denied a patent after
the exhaustion of available avenues of appeal.177
If in
reexamination it is found that the patent was granted in error, the
patentee is not being deprived of what he or she rightfully
deserves, but rather is being relieved of something he or she
received in error. In this way, the patent invalidation proceeding
truly can function as a curative mechanism. Permitting the
patentee to try his or her luck in a different forum after having
been denied a patent in the manner a patent is usually obtained, is
unfair to competitors.
A determination of validity by the patent invalidation board,
followed by an exhaustion of avenues of appeal, similarly provides
the patentee with all of the rights that he or she would have
received during an original examination proceeding.
By
prohibiting that validity from being challenged in court or in the
PTO on the same bases by another party, however, the patentee is
permitted to enjoy the rights that he or she has rightfully obtained.
Third-party requesters have greater rights in the patent invalidation
proceeding than in the current reexamination because they have a
full array of appeal possibilities. Arguably, the only party that has
diminished rights in light of the proposed patent invalidation
system is the non-requesting public, as it is not permitted to
challenge a patent on the same bases that has been previously
attempted. Though, this does not really injure the public. In the
case of questions based solely on prior art, someone may not bring
a request based on prior art that has already been considered in any
capacity. Therefore, this preclusion does not change. In the case
of questions based on testimonial evidence, the non-requester
would be able to come forth in the case of new evidence. Thus,
while protecting the patentee’s enjoyment of his or her patent and
177

Commentators have discussed whether a procedure of this type would violate the
patentee’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. Most, however, agree that the
patentee is not entitled to the jury trial, and thus must only get a fair, legal process. See,
e.g., Janis, supra note 15, at 38–40, 87–92.

OSENGA FORMAT

254

12/9/2003 2:25 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 14:217

preventing harassment, the proposed rules for the patent
invalidation proceedings do not tie the hands of third-party
requesters or the general public.
CONCLUSION
While the importance of consumer, investor, inventor, and
court confidence in the validity of patents cannot be overstated, the
problem of increasingly decentralized knowledge bases, combined
with rapidly changing technology, has intensified concern about
the PTO’s ability to ensure patent validity. Patent invalidity is
often challenged in court, in front of judges with little or no
technical expertise and full dockets. Further, litigation costs are
skyrocketing. It is in light of these realities that reexamination
reform must begin.
Reexamination has proven insufficient to meet its initially
stated goal of improving confidence in patent validity, largely
because it simply not being used. A dual goal has also been
advanced along with reexamination reform—the reduction of
patent litigation—but that goal is equally unserved by both ex parte
and inter partes reexamination. While a number of proposals have
been raised for reforming reexamination, including the inter partes
reexamination introduced in the AIPA, these proposals either fall
short or are so radical as to be merely academic.
Unless the reexamination proceedings are reformed,
reexamination will continue to be underutilized, with both patent
holders and accused infringers preferring to take their battles to the
courthouse.
By creating an attractive mechanism with a
meaningful legal effect, contests regarding validity would be
decided by a more experienced forum, which would boost patent
validity confidence. Further, in making the PTO the preliminary
arbiter of invalidity issues, the goal of reducing patent litigation
would be facilitated. The time has come to truly heal the
reexamination procedure so that it can finally withstand the burden
that it was designed to support.

